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Lawrence Lessig*
Since lawyers  have been  thinking about  cyberspace,  there has been a
debate  about  whether  there  is  a  law  of  cyberspace.  Judge  Frank
Easterbrook famously said there was not.  More accurately,  he said legal
academics  should  not  speak  as  if there  were,  since  the  "best way  to
learn  the  law  applicable  to  specialized  endeavors  is  to  study  general
rules."]
I have  been a skeptic  of Judge Easterbrook's  skepticism.2  Professor
Orin  Kerr  has  been  a  skeptic  as  well,  though  for  different  reasons.
Professor  Kerr  believes  there  is  something  special  about  the  law  of
cyberspace  because  there  is  a  particularly  difficult  question  of
"perspective" in the law of cyberspace.3  I agree, but I also believe there
is a particularly  difficult and general question that the law of cyberspace
raises  about  how  law  and  technology  interact.  Just  as  the  law  and
economics  movement  taught lawyers  that understanding  the interaction
between rules and economic incentives  was essential if regulations were
to  have  their  intended  effect,  so  too  does  cyberlaw  teach  that  an
understanding  of the interaction  between  rules  and technical  structures
is essential if regulations  are to have their intended effect.
*  Professor of Law, Stanford Law School.  This text is adapted from a keynote address  given
at the Loyola University  Chicago School of Law 2003  Law Journal Conference, "Technology and
Governance:  How  the Internet  Has Changed Our Conceptions of Governance  and Institutions."
1.  Frank H.  Easterbrook,  Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U.  CHI.  LEGAL  F. 207,
209  (analyzing  a  statement  made  by  the  former  Dean  of  the  University  of Chicago,  Gerhard
Casper, who said that his law school's curriculum encompassed the entire  law).
2.  Lawrence  Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113  HARV.  L. REV.
501,  502 (1999).
3.  Orin  S. Kerr, The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law, 91  GEO.  L.J. 357, 362-63 (2003)
(explaining  that the  analysis of cyberlaw issues can  produce very  different  results depending  on
whether one  views them from the perspective  of Internet users,  who experience  the Internet  as a
series of "virtual  reality"  abstractions that include activities  such as chat, e-mail, and shopping, or
from an  external perspective,  focusing  on the  physical makeup  and  hardware of the Internet  and
its place  within the  material  world).  "In  a surprising number of situations,  we arrive at one result
when applying law from  an internal perspective  and a different result when  applying law from an
external  perspective."  Id. at 357.Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
The aim of this  short essay  is  to continue  that claim.  I  describe  two
types of cases where  we can learn something about  law in general  from
the interaction between law and technology in particular.
Not-  Too-Much-But-Not-Too-Little Goods
Some  say  you  cannot  have  too  much  of  a good  thing.  That  is not
quite true.  There are some things that are good things, which means we
are better off with them than without them.  But for some of these good
things,  more  is not necessarily  better.  For these good things, there  can
be too much of a good thing.
Two  examples  of  this  kind  of  good  are  intellectual  property  and
privacy.
Intellectual  property  is  clearly  a  good.  No  modem  society  can
flourish unless it accords at least some protection for creative work.  No
doubt, not all societies  have done  so.  Our society, for example,  did not
protect  foreign copyrights  for  the first  100  years of the Republic.  But
we, and most modem nations,  are beyond that stage now.  Most modem
nations  give  creators  some  amount  of  exclusive  protection  for  their
creative work.
But  as  our  tradition  attests,  and  economists  confirm,  just  because
some  intellectual  property  is  good,  it  does  not  follow  that  more
intellectual  property  is  better.  More  precisely,  just  because  some
protection  is  good,  it doesn't follow  that  increasing  that protection  is
better.  Too  much  intellectual  property  protection  can  stifle follow-on
innovation.  As Judge Richard Posner puts it:
An expansion  of copyright protection might...  reduce the output  of
literature..,  by increasing  the royalty expense of writers.  The works
of previous  writers  are inputs  into current  work,  and these inputs  get
more  expensive  the  more  those  earlier  works  are  protected  by
copyright....  Thus  writers  themselves  might  as  a  group  prefer  less
copyright  protection  in  order  to reduce  the cost  to  them  of writing
their  own works,  even  though  it would  mean  forgoing  some  income
from  the  sale  of  those  works  because  they  would  be  less  fully
protected against copying.
4
The  aim of policymakers  therefore  must be  to  strike  a  balance-to
ensure  that society  secures to creators  some protection for their creative
work while also ensuring that that protection  does not reach too far.
Privacy  evinces  the  same  need  for  balance.  Every  free  society
believes that there is some realm of individual life that should be free of
4.  RICHARD A.  POSNER, LAW  AND  LITERATURE  396-97 (1998).
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surveillance  or invasion.  The  strong  form of this view  claims that  this
realm is beyond government regulation.5  The weaker form would assert
that this realm at least should  be free presumptively  from state control.
In either view, privacy is a good because it insulates the individual  from
improper control.
But no one believes that individuals have an absolute right of privacy.
A bank has  a legitimate  claim  to know  whether I have  defrauded  other
lenders  before.  My dean  has  a  legitimate  claim  to know  whether  I  in
fact  graduated  from  law  school.  Fraud  at  a  minimum  limits  the
legitimate  claims to privacy.  And  many believe that minimum is  much
thicker than just fraud.
Here too, then, policymakers  must seek a balance.  Their aim must be
to guarantee enough privacy  to ensure the flourishing  of a free  society.
But  they  must  also  make  sure  that  individuals  don't  have  too  much
privacy,  if the  public  benefits  of  information  are  not  to  be  defeated.
Again, as Judge Posner describes:
The  strongest  defenders  of  privacy  usually  define  the  individual's
right to privacy  as  the right to control  the flow  of information  about
him ....
To  the  extent  that  personal  information  is  concealed  in  order  to
mislead, the case for giving it legal protection is ...  weak.  Protection
would  simply  increase  transaction  costs,  much  as  if  we  permitted
fraud in the sale of goods.6
So how  do policymakers  achieve  this balance?  What  factors should
they consider?
From the traditional perspective of legal science, the only factors that
get considered  are  those  directly  tied  to regulation.  We  "balance"  the
protections for intellectual property by considering the sum of statutory
and  common-law  protections.  We evaluate  the  protections  of privacy
by  considering  those  same  protections,  as  well  as  the  constitutional
perspective.  Policymaking  from  this perspective  is  simply  the process
5.  See, e.g., Lawrence  v. Texas,  123  S.  Ct. 2472, 2475 (2003).  Justice Kennedy  wrote:
Liberty protects the person  from unwarranted government  intrusions into a dwelling  or
other private  places.  In  our  tradition  the  State  is  not  omnipresent in  the  home.  And
there are  other spheres  of our lives  and  existence, outside  the  home,  where  the  State
should not  be  a dominant presence.  Freedom extends  beyond  spatial bounds.  Liberty
presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression,  and
certain intimate conduct.
Id.
6.  Richard  A.  Posner, An  Economic Theory of Privacy, REGULATION,  May/June  1978,  at  19,
20, 22.
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of  tuning  legal  code.  And  changes  in  policy,  from  this  perspective,
simply map changes in this legal code.
From  the  perspective  of cyberlaw,  however,  policymaking  cannot
function  focused on legal  code  alone.  Policymaking  instead requires  a
consideration  of  the  interaction  between  this  legal  code  and  the
architecture  or  technology  within  which  this  code  functions.  The
protection of intellectual  property is determined  not just by the law that
protects  intellectual  property  but  also  b)'  the  technical  infrastructure
within  which  intellectual  property  exists.  Thus,  before  the  spread  of
technologies  to  enable  consumer  peer-to-peer  file  sharing,  the
intellectual  property  on  an  audio  CD  was  relatively  well  protected.
After  the  rise  of consumer  peer-to-peer  file  sharing  and  peer-to-peer
systems  generally,  that same intellectual property is protected relatively
poorly.  The  change  in  protection  is  a  change  caused  by  changing
technology.  The  law  remains  constant,  but  the  effective  policy
protecting  intellectual  property  is  affected  by  a  change  in  the
technological context within which intellectual property exists.
The  same point  can be made about  privacy.  When the  Internet was
first deployed, its architecture  produced relative  anonymity for users  of
the  Internet.  The  basic  protocols  did  not  identify  who  people  were,
where  they came  from, or  what  use they  were  making  of the Internet.
That information  is not embedded in the  basic Internet protocol,  which
means  that  the  basic  protocols  protect  the  user  from  inadvertently
revealing this information.
To  those who  valued the privacy  effected by this initial architecture,
this  failure to provide data was a feature of the original Internet.  But to
some, this failure to provide data was a bug, not a feature.  The inability
to know who people were, or where they came from, made it impossible
for  the  Internet  to  support  certain  kinds  of transactions.  It  made  it
particularly  hard  for  the  government  to  monitor  or  track  individual
behavior.
7.  See, e.g.,  LAWRENCE  LESSIG,  CODE  AND  OTHER  LAWS  OF CYBERSPACE  122,  124 (1999)
(discussing  how  changes  in  technology  have  affected  the  level  of copy  protection  afforded  to
authors).  As I've written before:
Before  the printing press  ...  there  was not much need to protect an author's copyright.
Copying was  so expensive  that [the] nature  itself protected  that right.  But  as the  cost
of copying decreased,  the threat  to the author's  control  increased.  As each  generation
has delivered  a  technology  better  than  the  last, the  ability of the  copyright  holder to
protect her intellectual  property has been weakened.
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The  most  obvious  example  of  a  transaction  disabled  by  this  early
design  of the network  was  basic Internet commerce.  When  the World
Wide Web  was first born,  the basic protocol was  "stateless."  A server
could not automatically keep track of who  was accessing  a web page.  It
couldn't  know,  for  example,  that  I  was  the  person  who  ordered  100
copies of Lessig's latest book when I moved from  the order page to the
check-out  lane.  Without  a  way  to  authenticate  states,  it  would  be
impossible to keep track of purchases.
In  1995,  the  Netscape  corporation  fixed  this.  In  version  2.0  of its
browser, it released  a protocol for the "cookies"  technology.  "Cookies"
enable  a  web  server  to  deposit  a  bit  of code  on  a  client's  computer.8
That code  then identifies the browser to the server.  Once identified, the
server knows  with  whom it is dealing.  And once  it knows  whom  it is
dealing  with,  it  can  serve  that  person  according  to  the  terms  of  any
agreement.
As  cookies  became  more  prevalent,  however,  they  had  a  more
general  effect on the Internet.  Now it was  easier for information  about
users  of the Internet  to become  known.  And this  in turn  meant  it was
easier to track who did what on the Internet.
Thus,  as the ability to track  increased, this meant that privacy  on the
Internet  decreased.  This decrease  came  not  from  law.  This decrease
came from a change  in technology.
In  both cases,  my point  so far  is simply  descriptive.  The  effective
protection for intellectual property and privacy depends upon the sum of
the  protections  from  both  law  and  technology.  And  likewise,  the
changes in protection for intellectual property  and privacy depend upon
both the changes in law and the changes in technology.
Yet  this  fairly  obvious  point  seems  lost  on  policymakers,  at  least
policymakers  keen  on  maintaining  balance.  Or  alternatively,  if  the
point is not lost on policymakers,  then recent policy  is a good sign  that
in neither context are policymakers interested in maintaining balance.
Consider  the  battles  about  intellectual  property  that currently  rage
among policymakers.  We're currently in the middle of a copyright war,
as the recording industry and Hollywood  battle the Internet.  This battle
was  engendered  by  the  emergence  of  a  digital  network  that,  by
consequence  of its design, allowed  the distribution of perfect copies  of
8.  See  generally  NETSCAPE,  PERSISTENT  CLIENT  STATE  HTTP  COOKIES,  at
http://wp.netscape.comnewsref/std/cookie-spec.html  (last visited Oct.  16, 2003) (describing how
cookies  work);  Netscape  Navigator,  in  WIKIPEDIA,  at  http://www.wikipedia.org/
wiki/NetscapeNavigator (last modified  Sept. 8,  2003) (explaining the development of Netscape).
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digital content for free.  That meant that it was increasingly  difficult for
content owners  to control the distribution  of their content.  This in turn
has inspired  a reaction by content owners to reassert control, and  hence,
protection, of their content.
The reaction has been on two fronts-both legal and technical.  First,
the content industry pushed for changes in the law protecting  copyright.
These  changes  increased  the  legal  protections  securing  content  and
extended  the term  under which  content was  protected.  But in addition
to  these  legal  changes,  technologists  have  been  working  on technical
changes  designed  to  correct,  or  counterbalance,  the  effect  of  the
Internet's design.
These technical changes  include an  array of technologies designed to
enable  "trusted  systems"  for content.  Trusted  systems would  facilitate
the  controlled  distribution  of protected  content,  counteracting  the  lack
of control produced by the Internet.  Examples of these technologies are
many:  encryption  technologies  to control  the copying  of CDs,  digital-
wrapper  technologies  to  lock  up  content  unless  the  user  has  the right
key,  etc.  No  single  standard  has  yet  to emerge,  but the  support for  a
strong system of trust is being deployed by Microsoft and others.
From  a  policy  perspective,  the  question  should  be  whether  this
change  in  technology,  in  response  to  a  change  in  technology,
reestablishes  balance  between  protection  of intellectual  property  and
access  to intellectual  property.  One  way to  answer  that question  is to
ask  whether  the  change  preserves  traditional  limits  on  intellectual
property.  For example,  will "fair use" continue  in  a world governed by
"trusted systems,"  or will  "fair use" be coded away by technologies  that
regulate  access to copyrighted material?9
It is clear at least that technologies can be coded to remove traditional
freedoms  of fair use.  An  eBook  reader,  for example,  can disable  the
ability  to  print  a  short  selection  from  a book,  even  though  printing  a
short selection from the book would plainly be considered fair use.  Or
9.  Eldred v. Ashcroft,  123 S. Ct. 769, 788-89 (2003).  The Supreme  Court said:
In addition  to spurring  the  creation  and publication of new  expression,  copyright
law contains  built-in First Amendment accommodations.
...  [T]he  "fair  use"  defense  allows  the  public  to  use  not  only  facts  and  ideas
contained  in  a copyrighted  work, but  also expression  itself  in  certain circumstances.
Codified at  17 U.S.C. § 107, the defense provides: "The  fair use of a copyrighted  work,
including  such  use  by  reproduction  in  copies ...  for  purposes  such  as  criticism,
comment,  news  reporting,  teaching  (including  multiple  copies  for  classroom  use),
scholarship,  or  research,  is  not  an  infringement  of copyright."  The  fair  use defense
affords considerable  "latitude  for scholarship and comment,"  and even for parody.
Id. (citations omitted).Law Regulating  Code Regulating  Law
the  technology  could  be  designed  to  disable  the  capacity  to  cut  and
paste from  one  document  to another,  as a  way to control  the ability  to
quote.
These  controls  come  from  the  code,  not  from  the  law.  Indeed,  in
most cases,  they are controls that exceed  any control that the law would
otherwise  allow.  You  couldn't claim  a violation  of the  copyright  if a
user of your book  Xeroxed  three  pages  of your  novel.  But you  could
use these controls built into  an eBook  reader to effect exactly that kind
of control.  The code  could  thus remove  a kind of access  that the law
would otherwise protect.
If balance  were  the  objective  of  the  policymakers  tuning  copyright
law,  then  this  ability  to  code  away  fair  use  should  suggest  a  policy
response to reinforce  fair use.  This response  could either mandate  that
this code  protect  traditional  fair  use,  or more  generally,  it could  limit
control beyond the control  that the law otherwise  imposes.  Or the law
could  recognize  affirmatively  the  right  of  users  to  "hack"  code  that
interferes  with  access  protected  by  the  traditional  limits  of  copyright
law.
Yet the response of policymakers  has been  precisely the opposite.  In
1998,  Congress  passed  the  Digital  Millennium  Copyright  Act
("DMCA"),  which not only failed to recognize any affirmative  right to
gain  access  consistent  with  traditional  limits  of  fair  use,  but
affirmatively  proscribed  any  effort  to  circumvent  code  protecting
content.11  The  DMCA  thus  not  only  fails  to  balance  the  imbalance
caused by changes in code; the DMCA plainly exacerbates it.
This  failure  of policymaking  is  either  a  product  of the  failure  to
account for both technology  and law together, or it manifests a decision
by policymakers  (encouraged by content owners) to change  the tradition
of balance in copyright.  Congress says it is not changing the balance of
copyright  law  in  the  DMCA  at  least.  The  DMCA  explicitly  states
"[n]othing  in  this  section  shall  affect  rights,  remedies,  limitations,  or
defenses  to  copyright  infringement,  including  fair  use,  under  this
title." 12  But whatever it means to do, its effect is to weaken the balance
10.  Digital Millennium  Copyright Act,  Pub. L. No.  105-304,  112  Stat. 2860  (1998)  (codified
as amended  in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C, 28 U.S.C, and 35  U.S.C.).
11.  17 U.S.C.  §  1201  (2000 & West Supp. 2003).
12.  Id. §  1201(c)(1);  see also H.R. REP. No.  105-551,  pt.  2 (1998)  (discussing  the DMCA and
fair use considerations).  The House Report states:
The Committee considers  it particularly important to ensure that the concept  of fair use
remains  firmly established in the  law.... H.R.  2281,  as reported  by the  Committee on
Commerce,  fully  respects  and  extends  into  the  digital  environment  the  bedrock
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of copyright law.  Rather  than  tuning  a  "not  too much,  not too  little"
value, the effect is to skew the protection toward the extreme.
The same  dynamic  exists in  the context of privacy.  As  I described,
the Internet initially secured a strong degree of privacy.  When tied with
encryption technologies,  the privacy enabled was extraordinarily  strong.
This  led  the  government  initially  to  try  to  control  encryption
technologies.  The government banned  the export of strong encryption
technologies  and  tried  to  push  as  a standard  an encryption  technology
that would preserve a back door that government could use.13
These  efforts  at  controlling  encryption  were  flawed,  but  the
government's motivation is understandable given the "not too much, not
too little" character of privacy.  The concern of the government was that
privacy  would be  too strong; the response was to regulate  technologies
to remedy  that  concern.  That particular  response  failed  (fortunately).
But regulating encryption  was not the  only  way the government  could
alter  the  balance  protecting  privacy.  While  the  government  failed  to
restrict the  means  to  encrypt, in fact  the general  encryption  of content
has  not yet  become  common.  Thus,  the  government  could induce,  or
benefit  from,  other  changes  in  technology  designed  to  increase  the
identifiability of behavior in cyberspace.  Some of these changes are the
simple by-product  of changes  driven by commerce;  others have  a more
direct connection to government policy.
The  first  of  these  changes  I  have  already  described-cookies
technology.  But cookies  are  not the end of the effective  modifications
of  the  original  privacy  of  the  Internet.  Instead,  there  has  been  an
explosion  of technologies  designed  to  identify  who  people  are, where
they come from, and what activity they are engaged in.
These changes,  like the changes protecting  copyrighted  material,  are
also  affected  by  the  law.  The  requirement  of jurisdiction-specific
regulations  has  pushed  the  demand  for  technologies  that  map  the
physical  location  of a  user with  a  specific jurisdiction.  This,  in turn,
principle  of  "balance"  in  American  intellectual  property  law  for  the  benefit of both
copyright owners and users.
H.R. REP. No.  105-55 1, pt.  2, at 26.
13.  See  Paul  E.  Proctor &  Christian  Byrnes,  The  Politics of Cryptography, PERFORMANCE
COMPUTING,  Oct.  1,  1999,  at  25;  John  Schwartz,  Disputes on  Electronic Message Encryption
Take on New Urgency, N.Y.  TIMES,  Sept. 25,  2001,  at Cl,  available at LEXIS,  News  Library,
The  New  York  Times  File;  Encryption:  The  Story  So  Far, WASHINGTONPOST.COM,  at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/tech/analysis/encryption/background.htm  (last  updated
Sept.  17,  1997);  see  also  ELEC.  PRIVACY  INFO.  CTR.,  CRYPTOGRAPHY  POLICY,  at
http://www.epic.org/crypto  (last visited  Oct. 3,  2003)  (providing  information  on encryption  law
proposals).
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enables  effective  local  zoning  of content  on  the  Internet  according  to
local rules.
14
A  much  more  dramatic  example  is  offered  by  the  Patriot  Act. 15
Under  that Act,  the government's  authority  to  survey  Internet  activity
has  dramatically  increased.  The  government  may  monitor  surfing
behavior  of anyone  upon a  showing  to  a judge  that the  monitoring  is
"relevant"  to  an ongoing  criminal  investigation.  So  too  the  standard
required  of American  intelligence  agencies  has  been  lowered.  Those
agencies  have  been  granted  new  powers  to  engage  in  roving
surveillance domestically as well. 16
This increase  in authority to monitor behavior takes advantage  of the
character  of  the  Internet,  which  is  to  enable  a  vast  amount  of  data
gathering  in a manner  wholly  invisible  to the  target of the  monitoring.
This shift in the technical architecture, tied to the shift in legal authority,
makes  the  Internet  a far more pervasive  surveillance  medium than  any
other in social life.
The point in both contexts is that policymakers must account for both
law and technology in securing  a balance for "not too much, and not too
little"  goods.  That account  must therefore rely upon  a relatively  subtle
appreciation  of technical  architectures.  The government  seems attuned
to this need in the context of surveillance; content holders are attuned to
this need  in the context of copyright.  The only perspective  that seems
to have missed this need is the perspective defending a public domain.
These  two  extremes  have  converged  in  the  latest  battle  in  the
copyright  war.  The  Recording  Industry  Association  of  America
14.  Jonathan  Zittrain, Internet Points of Control, 44 B.C.  L.  REV.  653,  688 (2003).  Zittrain
writes:
The  Internet's brilliant  methodology  of data routing-a  flexible set of intermediaries
functioning  in  tandem  yet  with  little  central  coordination--offers  multiple
opportunities  for control  that  are  only now  coming  into  focus  for  regulators.  Such
control cannot  be accepted,  even if initiated  for substantively  good  intentions,  without
the  most exacting  of processes  to  avoid  abuse, including  a comprehensive  framework
where  sovereigns'  actions  to  block  material  are  thoroughly  documented  and  open  to
challenge.  If  carefully  implemented  and  circumscribed,  however,  government
mandated  destination-based  filtering  stands the  greatest  chance  of approximating  the
legal  and practical  frameworks  by which  sovereigns  currently  sanction  illegal content
apart from the Internet.
Id.
15.  USA  PATRIOT  Act  of  2001,  Pub. L.  No.  107-56,  115  Stat.  272  (codified  in  scattered
sections of U.S.C.).
16.  See  ELEC.  FRONTIER  FOUND.,  EFF  ANALYSIS  OF  THE  PROVISIONS  OF  THE  USA
PATRIOT  ACT  THAT  RELATE  TO  ONLINE  ACTIVITIES,  at  http://www.eff.org/Privacy/
Surveillance/Terrorism//20011031  eff  usapatriotanalysis.php  (Oct. 31,  2001).
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("RIAA")  has recently launched  a series of lawsuits against individuals
who share content. 17  Yet these suits depend upon the increasing ability
of Internet  Service  Providers  ("ISPs")  to  identify  users  of  different
services.  Thus, Verizon  and  other ISPs have  been  forced by  subpoena
to reveal the identity of customers whom the RIAA says use file-sharing
networks.
Thus, a reality  is slowly dawning upon many Internet users.  There  is
no  anonymity  in  cyberspace.  Indeed,  the  legal  system  has  driven
commercial  entities  to  a  place  where  the  behavior  and  use  of  the
Internet is perpetually and effectively monitored.  That may be good for
some and bad for others.  But it is a level of surveillance we have never
before  seen.  Music fans of every generation since the cassette tape have
shared  music  with each  other.  This  is  the first  generation  when  that
sharing has become punishable and traceable.
Some-Regulation-Better-Than-None  Examples
A second class of cases in which the interaction between  legal policy
and technology  matters we could call the "some  regulation is better than
no regulation"  cases.  In these cases, the failure to regulate has perverse
consequences,  even  for  the  values  thought  to  be  served  by  the
regulatory forbearance.
Two  examples  are  pornography  and  spam.  Both  are  examples  of
speech that many would like to filter, but that are not themselves illegal.
When both began to become common on the Internet, there was a strong
push to find ways to facilitate filtering.
In the  context of pornography,  the push initially  manifested  itself in
the form of legislation.  In  1996, Congress enacted the Communications
Decency Act ("CDA"), 18 designed  to ban the distribution of "indecent"
material  to  minors. 19  That  statute  was  obviously  unconstitutional  as
17.  See  Frank  Ahrens,  Record  Industry  Sues  4  Students  Running File-Sharing Networks,
WASHINGTONPOST.COM,  at  http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A22370-2003
Apr3.html  (Apr.  3,  2003);  Jane  Black,  Big Music:  Win  Some,  Lose  a Lot More?, Bus.  WK.
ONLINE,  at  http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/may2003/tc2003055_8073
tc078.htm (May  5,  2003); see also Zack  Rosen,  $97,800,000,000,  at http://www.ews.uiuc.edu/
-zrosen/  (last  visited  Oct.  16,  2003)  (providing  information  relating to  the  RIAA's  2003  suit
against the four college students).
18.  Communications  Decency  Act of  1996, Pub.  L. No.  104-104,  110 Stat.  133  (codified  as
amended in scattered sections of 18 and 47  U.S.C.).
19.  Id. §  502 (codified  at 47  U.S.C.  § 223(a) (2000), amended by PROTECT Act, Pub.  L. No.
108-21,  § 603  (1)(B),  117  Stat. 687 (2003)).
Whoever-
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enacted,  and  the  Supreme  Court  quickly  struck  the  law  down.20
Congress  then  enacted  the  Child  Online  Protection  Act  ("COPA")  in
1998,  which tried  to achieve  the same end  through more  constitutional
means.
2 1
These  legislative  efforts  to  facilitate  the  blocking  of pornography
have  been  resisted  by  many.  To  many,  these  efforts  smack  of
censorship.  The  government  is  taking  steps  to  make  possible  the
blocking of certain content, even if the government itself is not blocking
the content.  Those  steps, many believe, are  improper for a government
constrained by the First Amendment.
Yet  this  view  obscures  an  obvious  point  that  becomes  clear  when
considering  the interaction  between  the technical  infrastructure  and the
legal rules.
The  objective  of  many  who  resist  regulation  to  channel  or  zone
pornography  is to preserve free  speech values.  The regulation  is seen to
infringe those values; for this reason, the regulation is resisted.
But  the  absence  of  legal  regulation  to  respond  to  the  problem  of
pornography  is  not the  same as the absence  of regulation.  Instead, the
absence  of  legal  regulation  can  simply  increase  the  demand  for
technical  regulation-for  code  designed  to  respond  to  pornography.
This  technical  regulation  has  taken  a number  of forms,  from software
that  blocks  particular  websites,  to  labeling  standards  used  to  rate
..  makes, creates,  or solicits...  any comment,  request,  suggestion,  proposal,  image,
or other communication which is obscene or indecent, knowing that the recipient of the
communication  is under  18 years  of age...
•..  shall  be fined under title 18 [United States Code],  or imprisoned not more than  two
years,  or both.
Id.
20.  Reno  v. ACLU,  521  U.S.  844,  874 (1997)  (holding the Communications  Decency Act of
1996 unconstitutional  because  it "presents  a great[]  threat  of censoring speech that, in  fact, falls
outside the statute's scope").
Given  the  vague  contours  of the  coverage  of the  statute,  it  unquestionably  silences
some  speakers  whose  messages  would  be  entitled  to constitutional  protection.  That
danger provides  further  reason for insisting  that the statute  not be overly  broad.  The
CDA's burden  on protected speech cannot be justified if it could be avoided by a more
carefully  drafted statute.
Id.
21.  Child Online Protection Act, Pub. L. No.  105-277,  112  Stat. 2681-736  (1998)  (codified at
47 U.S.C.  §§ 230-231  (2000)).
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websites.  But  whatever  its  form,  the  technology  has  been  criticized
fairly strongly.
22
The particular criticism  that I want to focus on, however, is the over-
inclusiveness of this filtering software.  The technologies that have been
developed  in  response  to  the  problem  of  pornography  don't  limit
themselves  to pornography.  Instead,  these  technologies  enable  a wide
range of filtering, from pornography,  to  violence,  to  sites  that criticize
filtering.23  Thus,  the  scope  of  the  filtering  from  these  private,
technology-based  solutions  is  often  wider  than  the  scope  of filtering
aimed at by the initial drive to block pornography.
Yet  these  private  solutions  are  demanded  because  there  is  no
effective  public  solution  targeting  the  core  concern-pornography.
Thus, one consequence  of the absence of an effective  public  solution is
a  private  response  that  goes  beyond  the  scope  of  any  constitutional
objectives  of  the  law.  The  kind  of filtering  that  is  enabled  by  these
private technologies is more extensive  than the kind of filtering that the
law could, consistent with the First Amendment, require.
My point is not that private filtering  is bad, or that individuals  should
not be allowed to filter beyond  the scope of what Congress can filter.  It
is  instead a simpler point: that  the unintended  consequence  of a failure
22.  See  ACLU,  FAHRENHEIT  451.2:  IS  CYBERSPACE  BURNING?  (1997),  available at
http://archive.aclu.org/issues/cyber/burning.html  (last visited Oct.  3,  2003); Richard  J.  Peltz, Use
"The Filter You  Were Born With":  The  Unconstitutionality  of Mandatory Internet Filtering  for
the Adult Patrons of Public Libraries, 77  WASH.  L.  REV.  397,  410  (2002);  Adam Goldstein,
Note,  Like  a  Sieve:  The  Child Internet Protection Act and Ineffective  Filters in Libraries, 12
FORDHAM  INTELL.  PROP.  MEDIA  & ENT.  L.J.  1187,  1189-97  (2002);  Junichi  P. Semitsu,  Note,
Burning Cyberbooks in Public Libraries:  Internet Filtering  Software vs. the First  Amendment, 52
STAN. L.  REV.  509 passim (2000).
23.  PEACEFIRE,  ABOUT  PEACEFIRE.ORG,  at  http://www.peacefire.org/info/about-peacefire.
shtml (last  visited Oct. 3,  2003).  The website states:
Peacefire.org  was created in August  1996 to represent  the interests of people under
18 in the debate over freedom of speech on the Internet.
In  October  1998,  we  added  pages  to  Peacefire.org  about  how  to  disable  the
different censorware programs.
Peacefire first received  attention in  December  1996 when CYBERsitter added it to
their list of "pornographic"  Web sites and  sent a letter to our ISP threatening to block
all  of their  hosted  sites  if  Peacefire  were  not closed  down....  The  only content  on
Peacefire.org  at that time that  had anything  to do with  CYBERsitter was our original
CYBERsitter  page,  which  listed  some  of the  Web  sites  that  the  program  blocked,
including N.O.W.,  Mother Jones and the  International  Gay and Lesbian  Human Rights
Commission.
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to  regulate  properly  is often  a  greater  burden  on  the  spread  of speech
than an effective regulation  would achieve.  And, as a corollary,  if there
were effective regulation to deal with pornography,  much of the demand
for private blocking would evaporate.  The absence of public regulation
thus  induces  more  private  regulation;  and  the  presence  of  public
regulation can reduce the demand for expansive (and speech-burdening)
private regulation.
24
A  similar  pattern  exists  with  spam  regulation.  Unsolicited
commercial  e-mail  has  become  an  increasingly  burdensome  part of  e-
mail.  The  obvious  reason  for this  burden  is  the favorable  economics
that  the  Internet  offers  e-mail  advertisers.  Users  pay  for  the
transportation  cost  of e-mail;  advertisers  thus  get  to  free  ride  off  of
users.  The consequence  is  that  almost forty  percent  of e-mail  is  now
spam.
When this  problem initially  emerged,  there  were many  who  resisted
the idea of regulation  to deal with  spam.  Again, regulation was  seen as
a kind of censorship,  because  it was government  regulation effecting  a
restriction on speech.
Yet as  with pornography,  the consequence  of failing to  regulate  has
not been the absence of regulation.  Instead, there has been an explosion
of private  technologies designed  to facilitate  the filtering  of unsolicited
commercial e-mail.  These private  technologies,  as with the filtering of
pornography,  are  both  under-  and  over-inclusive.  They  are  under-
inclusive, because  spammers  can be counted  on to seek ways  to escape
the filters.  They  are over-inclusive  because  they block  a great  deal  of
speech that is not spam.
The  failure  of  this  technology  has  led  many  to  adopt  a  white-list
approach to e-mail-only accepting mail from people whom they know.
And  to  the  extent  this  response  becomes  common,  a  general  and
valuable  feature  of  the  original  design  of  the  Internet  is  inverted:  a
medium that facilitated the broad spread of content at low cost becomes
a  medium  that  requires  a  reservation  before  your  message  gets
delivered.
The lesson again is that the demand for private regulation increases in
this  context when public regulation  fails.  This is of course not a lesson
new to the Internet:  vigilantism may be necessary  in some contexts,  but
it  is  not  preferable  to  an  effective  government.  But  the  regulatory
power of  code  is much  greater  and  more plastic  in cyberspace,  so this
24.  See LESSIG,  supra note 7, at  181  (describing effective  private regulation).
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commonplace  point becomes  more  salient.  Here  too,  effective  public
regulation could reduce the demand for inefficient private regulation.
In  both  contexts,  the  integration  of  a  legal  and  technological
perspective yields  an initially counter-intuitive result.  Some regulation
may in fact advance  free speech interests more  than  no regulation, even
if that public regulation is a form of speech restriction.
Resistance
These examples are meant to mark two kinds of cases.  If these are in
fact kinds, then  there  will be other examples  as well.  But the  lessons
from these particular  examples  have  been resisted  to date.  And about
these  particular  instances  of  resistance,  I  make  some  general
observations.
The two  examples of good requiring balance  rather than extremes-
intellectual  property  and privacy-increasingly  push  to the  extreme  as
our legal system loses a capacity to articulate balance.  A powerful rent-
seeking  drives  the  extreme  in intellectual  property.  A powerful  terror
allows the extreme about privacy  to be achieved  almost without notice.
Understanding  the dynamic  between law and technology  is not likely to
remedy the problem in either case.  More powerful passions control.
But  the  dynamic between  law  and  technology  could  matter  to  the
second  class  of cases-the  "some-regulation-better-than-none"  cases.
Here  an  ideology  against regulation  limits  the  willingness  to regulate,
but  the consequence  of this  ideology  defeats  the  very  values  that  are
being defended.  Recognizing the dynamic could therefore help  advance
the protection of values  important here and  elsewhere.  But recognizing
this dynamic requires  incorporating  a perspective  that cyberlaw teaches.
American  law  has  traditionally  been  very  good  at  including  outside
perspectives  as  a  way  to  understand  the  legal  domain.  The  law  and
economics  movement  was just  a  maturation  of  the  realist  movement.
Both progressed by testing legal claims against the knowledge produced
by other disciplines.
That  same  openness  is  necessary  now.  As  many  are  beginning  to
recognize,  the single most salient  feature  of cyberspace  is its ability  to
embed  controls  that  resist  or  reinforce  values  that  we  bring  to
cyberspace.  We must understand  the manner in which these values  are
resisted  or  reinforced  if  we  are  to  continue  the  experiment  of  self-
government,  where  self-conscious  choice  determines  the  law  we  live
life subject to.
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